Impact Of Technology On Defense

EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen has announced €800 billion in defence spending under the #ReArm #Europe plan. This is where security, resilience and technology policy converge. At Institute for Innovation and Technology (iit), we combine our expertise on this topic under the name #GeoTechPolitics. As the war in Ukraine shows, the means of warfare and defence have changed dramatically.  ⛓️ If deterrence is to be credible, we need not only sufficient defence budgets but also resilient #supplychains. Batteries are an increasingly important technology for military applications. However, the value chains are heavily dominated by China, and this is no coincidence. 💪 #China is currently making political use of its dominant position by introducing trade permits for key technologies such as lithium and LF(M)P production technology and graphite products. 🏭 Meanwhile, European #gigafactory projects are struggling to ramp up while Chinese companies such as CATL and, most recently, CALB are announcing plans to expand their capacities here. 🔋 With this in mind, let us have a look at the essential role batteries play in a wide range of #militaryequipment:  * Communication & information systems (radios, satellite phones, internet access points, computers, tablets, etc.): high energy density, extended temperature and impact tolerances. * Autonomous systems (unmanned aerial, ground and water vehicles): high energy density, fast charging speed * Vehicles and propulsion systems (ships & submarines, infantry carriers, light vehicles): high robustness & safety, battery/capacitor hybrid systems * Weapon & guidance systems (guided missiles and precision weapons, active protection systems): high power, compact design, high safety * Surveillance & reconnaissance (night vision devices, mobile radar systems, cameras, jammers, drone defense): long service life, extended temperature, vibration and shock tolerances. * Satellite and space systems (satellites, uplink systems, navigation systems): security, extended temperature, vibration and shock tolerances. 💥 To put this into perspective: Ukraine has ramped up its own #drone production capacity to 2.5 million per year. Commercial drones like the Mavic 3 from DJI have a battery capacity of 77 Wh. This results in a battery demand of almost 200 MWh/a for Ukraine's drones alone. 📄 The #visualization of equipping soldiers with battery technology comes from the NATO STO Technical Report TR-SET-173-Part-I. The document is from 2014, which makes it clear that we need new and more up-to-date analysis on the subject. 👉 More information: * ReArm Europe: https://lnkd.in/eBvKB5A3 * Drone manufacturing in Ukraine: https://lnkd.in/eKb2WeAx * NATO STO Technical Report: https://t1p.de/c2bew

Zayed Military University: How the UAE Builds Power That Compounds The graduation of the second cohort of Zayed Military University, attended by HH Sheikh Hamdan Bin Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Crown Prince of Dubai and Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Defence, should not be read as a ceremonial milestone. It is a strategic signal. In today’s world, national power is no longer defined by force size alone, but by: • Leadership quality • Institutional depth • Technology integration • Decision-making under uncertainty 1. The Global Context: Why Military Education Now Matters More Than Hardware Global military spending has reached historic highs, exceeding $2.7 trillion annually, reflecting a more contested and unstable global environment. At this scale, the differentiator is not platforms alone it is the people and institutions that operate them. Advanced militaries increasingly prioritize: • Officer education and doctrine • Joint and multi-domain integration • Data-driven command systems • Strategic leadership development Military universities are treated as strategic infrastructure, not training centers. 2. The UAE Model: Capability Density Over Scale The UAE has long pursued a deliberate defense doctrine: • High capability over large force size • Integration over fragmentation • Readiness over reaction Publicly available SIPRI data historically places the UAE among the world’s leading defense investors relative to economic size, reflecting a sustained focus on modernization, readiness, and institutional strength. Zayed Military University is the human-capital core of this model. 3. Where Defense Meets Technology and the Economy Modern defense education globally now overlaps directly with: • Cyber and electronic warfare • Data-enabled logistics and command • AI-assisted decision systems • Multi-domain coordination (land, air, sea, cyber, space) Frontier technology is national infrastructure in the UAE, with AI projected to contribute ~14% of GDP by 2030, anchoring long-term security and economic resilience. 4. Institutions vs Assets Assets depreciate. Institutions compound. Platforms age. Leadership systems mature. A military university is a long-duration sovereign asset, producing leaders for evolving threats and long-term national objectives. 5. The Leadership Signal The presence of H.H. Sheikh Hamdan is not symbolic. It reinforces a clear doctrine: • People before platforms • Institutions before optics • Long-term statecraft before short-term response This is how serious nations prepare for the future. Quietly. Deliberately. Decades ahead. Zayed Military University is not graduating officers alone. It is shaping guardians of sovereignty, architects of stability, and leaders entrusted with the nation’s future. This is the UAE’s way: Build institutions that endure. Invest in people who compound. Think in generations not news cycles. The UAE is not rising. It has already decided where history will meet it.

Innovation theater is quietly undermining European military readiness. Across Europe’s armed forces, innovation has become a visible performance. Hackathons, accelerators, demo days, pilot programs, and venture-backed start-ups dominate the narrative of modernization. Slides are polished. Concepts are ambitious. Press releases are frequent. Yet when units ask the simple question, "what can we field, train on, and fight with tonight?", the answer is often far less impressive. A growing share of defense budgets is absorbed by experimental programs that promise future breakthroughs but deliver limited operational value in the near term. Venture capital logic has crept into military procurement. Growth narratives, platform visions, and perpetual pilots are rewarded over proven capability, reliability, and deployability. As a result, forces are encouraged to wait for the next iteration rather than equip themselves with systems that already work. The way I see it, this creates three structural problems. ⏳ First, time-to-fielding expands, precisely when strategic warning times are shrinking. Modern conflict does not wait for roadmap milestones or Series B funding rounds. ⚗️ Second, operators become test users, not warfighters. Units are asked to adapt to immature systems, absorb instability, and tolerate gaps that would be unacceptable in live operations. ✨ Third, MOTS solutions are crowded out, not because they lack capability, but because they lack 'glamour'. Mature, deployable systems are perceived as less innovative, even when they are fit for combat today. Don't get me wrong, though. Innovation matters. And Europe desperately needs technological edge. But innovation without urgency becomes theater. In a deteriorating security environment, armed forces cannot afford procurement cultures that optimize for visibility over readiness. The uncomfortable truth is this: readiness is not experimental. A system either works under operational pressure or it does not. The decisive advantage belongs to forces that prioritize what can be trained, deployed, and sustained now, while innovation continues in parallel, not in place of capability. Modernization should accelerate readiness, not postpone it.

The UK has just published its most comprehensive defence review in 25 years, and it reveals a military on the cusp of its biggest technological transformation since the Second World War. The review's most striking finding isn't about threats or spending—it's about how warfare itself is being fundamentally redefined by technology. As the document starkly notes, drones now kill more people than traditional artillery in Ukraine, and military advantage increasingly comes from speed of innovation rather than size of forces. The technological revolution outlined is comprehensive: Artificial Intelligence becomes central to everything. The review calls for a protected Defence AI Investment Fund and a digital targeting web by 2027 that connects sensors, decision-makers, and weapons across all domains in real-time. Data and digital systems are no longer optional extras—they're foundational to every military capability. Autonomous systems transform the battlefield equation. The UK will establish a Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre by February 2026, moving toward a high-low mix where 20% crewed platforms control 40% reusable autonomous systems and 40% single-use effectors like attack drones. This isn't just about adding drones—it's about completely reimagining how forces operate. Space and cyber become contested battlegrounds. A new CyberEM Command launches by end-2025 to coordinate operations in cyberspace—the only domain under daily attack. Meanwhile, space capabilities become critical as China and Russia's combined satellite fleets grew 70% in recent years, with quantum technologies promising to revolutionise both encryption and navigation. Innovation cycles accelerate dramatically. Defence procurement must shift from 6.5-year contract cycles to three-month rapid commercial exploitation, with a new UK Defence Innovation organisation receiving a ringfenced £400 million annual budget to harness commercial breakthroughs. Advanced weapons reshape deterrence calculations. From hypersonic missiles travelling five times the speed of sound to directed energy weapons like the UK's DragonFire system, the review highlights how precision, range, and speed are transforming military mathematics. This isn't just military modernisation—it's recognition that the character of warfare has changed more in the past decade than in the previous century. The question for defence industries and tech companies is clear: are you ready for this transformation? #DefenceTech #Innovation #AI #AutonomousSystems #DefenceReview #UKDefence

A very important point raised by Finland’s Chief of Defence. And one that deserves much more attention in Europe’s current technology hype cycle. General Janne Jaakkola recently warned against rushing the adoption of new military technologies without corresponding doctrinal and leadership reform. Because the real risk is not technological stagnation. The real risk is building expensive, complex systems that ultimately reduce operational effectiveness. This is something I have been emphasising repeatedly in my writing and talks. Technology alone does not transform defence. Institutions do. Key takeaways worth reflecting: 1. Technology hype can distort priorities Public debate often focuses on individual technologies- drones, AI, autonomy, amplified by social media and headlines. But technology visible at the tactical edge does not automatically translate into operational advantage. 2. Concepts and doctrine often follow technology when it should be the opposite. As Jaakkola noted, new technical solutions are often introduced to solve immediate battlefield problems, while concepts and doctrine emerge later, if they emerge at all.  That inversion is dangerous. Doctrine, leadership, and operational thinking should guide technology integration not chase it. 3. Over-engineering defence architectures can create fragility Layering new systems on top of existing structures risks creating heavy, expensive and ineffective systems.  Anyone who has worked inside large defence organisations has seen this happen. 4. Innovation ecosystems matter as much as technology Ukraine’s wartime innovation model works not just because of drones or software. It works because industry, battlefield feedback, and policy frameworks are tightly integrated. You cannot replicate that simply by purchasing hardware. Where this connects with my own work For a long time I’ve been arguing that many debates around defence AI and emerging technologies are framed incorrectly. People talk about algorithms, autonomy, platforms, sensors. But the real bottlenecks usually sit elsewhere: * institutional culture * procurement models * leadership mindset * decision-making structures * integration across systems * policy ... In other words defence innovation fails far more often because of institutions than because of technology. The deeper question for Europe. Europe does not lack technology. What we must learn is how to integrate technology into doctrine, command structures, operational thinking fast enough. That requires: * leadership adaptation * organisational change * new approaches to manoeuvre and decision cycles Exactly the point being raised here and it is a conversation Europe needs to take seriously. #DefenceInnovation #MilitaryTransformation #AIinDefence #FutureOfWarfare #CommandAndControl #EuropeanDefence https://lnkd.in/dSu6fxJK

Updated Lessons Learned from Technological Change in the War in Ukraine. In February 2024, in an article published in the Belgian magazine Knack, I argued that the war in Ukraine would become the first true data-conflict of the modern era. Nearly two years later, that prediction has clearly materialised. Data, how it is collected, processed, shared, protected, and acted upon, has become a central determinant of military effectiveness. What the war now demonstrates is not just rapid technological adaptation, but a deeper shift in how modern warfare is organised, sustained, and learned. Several early lessons turned into structural realities. 1. Warfare Has Become Iterative Modern war no longer follows fixed capability cycles. Advantage comes from continuous adjustment under combat conditions. Ukraine has connected frontline feedback directly to software updates, production changes, and redeployment. Learning speed now matters more than initial technological advantage. 2. Attrition Is the Baseline High loss rates of drones, sensors, and digital systems are now normal. Operational effectiveness depends on the ability to replace and regenerate capabilities, not on preserving individual platforms. 3. Data, Software, and Connectivity Drive Combat Power Operational advantage increasingly comes from fast sensor-to-shooter loops and resilient digital infrastructure. Ukraine’s use of cloud services has enabled battlefield data to be stored, processed, and shared across dispersed units. At the same time, Starlink has provided critical connectivity when terrestrial networks were disrupted, allowing command, targeting, and logistics functions to continue under fire. 4. Civil-Military Boundaries Are Structurally Blurred Commercial providers of cloud services, satellite communications, and software have become permanent contributors to military effectiveness. This is no longer ad hoc wartime improvisation. 5. Industrial Capacity Is a Warfighting Variable Ukraine’s ability to localise production, adjust designs, and scale output has had direct battlefield impact. Industrial agility has compensated for material and numerical disadvantages. 6. Tactical Innovation Shapes Strategy Frontline units are driving innovation faster than doctrine can absorb it. Strategic and doctrinal adaptation increasingly follows battlefield experimentation. 7. Autonomy Advances Out of Necessity Autonomy has expanded due to communications disruption, time pressure, and manpower limits. Human-machine teaming, rather than full autonomy, has emerged as the dominant model. The war in Ukraine confirms that technological change in warfare is continuous. The defining feature of this conflict is not a single system, but the central role of data. For NATO, the principal risk is no longer technological surprise, but institutional rigidity in a war defined by constant adaptation.

TECH ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH: A new advanced counter-drone system was fielded to enhance battlefield awareness and defense, but it failed to deliver results because key elements of DOTMLPF-P were neglected. While the Materiel (the counter-drone equipment itself) was cutting-edge, no DOCTRINE was established for its use in joint operations, leaving Warfighters and commanders unsure how to integrate it with other high tech weapons. TRAINING for operators was inadequate, leading to mishandling and underutilization—some were injured trying to employ it. The FACILITIES required for maintenance and secure data transfer were not available in theater, causing downtime and many hours wasted and reaction time slowed using hand carried notes with couriers. Without addressing these critical areas, the system’s potential was wasted, and warfighters were left with a capability that couldn’t meet operational needs. [note: This was an AI-generated hypothetical case. We have plenty of real world cases just like it.] The DOTMLPF-P framework ensures defense acquisition delivers integrated, effective combat solutions to warfighters by addressing all facets of readiness—Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy. By systematically analyzing capability gaps and prioritizing non-materiel solutions first, it minimizes waste, accelerates deployment, and creates holistic, adaptable capabilities that reliably perform in modern warfare. This approach aligns every element supporting the warfighter to maximize operational effectiveness and mission success. Here’s a breakdown: 1. Doctrine: Fundamental principles and guidelines that govern the way military operations are planned, conducted, and supported. Best practices for operational concepts, procedures, and policies. 2. Organization: The structure of military units and organizations. Assess whether current force configurations, roles, and hierarchies are effective for addressing mission needs. 3. Training: Examines the preparation of personnel to perform their duties effectively. This includes individual, team, and collective training at all levels to ensure readiness for specific operations. 4. Materiel: The quipment, systems, and supplies required to accomplish missions. This includes acquiring new technologies or improving existing ones to close capability gaps. 5. Leadership and Education: Development of leaders and the education of the force. Ensure leaders are equipped to make sound decisions and manage operations effectively. 6. Personnel: Recruiting, managing, and retaining the right people with the required skills, knowledge, and abilities to execute missions. 7. Facilities: Infrastructure needs, such as bases, training ranges, power, water, and logistics hubs. . 8. Policy: Encompasses regulations, laws, and guidelines that govern operations and acquisitions. It ensures that the legal and procedural framework supports the mission effectively.

𝗪𝗮𝗿𝗧𝗲𝗰𝗵 𝗡𝗲𝘅𝘂𝘀: 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗮𝘂𝘁𝗼𝗻𝗼𝗺𝗼𝘂𝘀 𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗳𝗮𝗿𝗲 “Armis et Litteris 48” (Theresan Military Academic Forum 2025) is one of those rare compilations where tech, organisation, and doctrine are treated as one system—not separate stovepipes. I’ll publish several posts, each focusing on a different article and its most actionable takeaway for modern forces. 🔍 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱 𝗿𝘂𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗼𝗹𝘂𝗺𝗲 ▪️ AI isn’t “adding efficiency.” It is reshaping decision cycles and mission command assumptions. ▪️ Digital twins + imitation learning point to the next advantage: training on reality faster than the enemy adapts. ▪️ Additive manufacturing is framed as a war-economy enabler: rapid iteration, local production, cost imposition at scale. ▪️ Small drones shaping warfare is treated as engineering + integration, not just tactics. ▪️ Resilience lands where it should: energy, supply chains, and logistics as contested technology. 🧩 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗶𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗱𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗹 Most forces obsess over buying autonomous systems. The harder problem is industrialising learning: doctrine that absorbs new tech weekly, procurement that tolerates iteration, and units that translate data into changed behaviour. *In modern war, speed of learning is real firepower.*

Defense architectures are being forced to adapt faster than their original design cycles allowed. Once vulnerabilities become visible, engineers add sensors, expand detection layers, and tighten response loops across the kill chain. Each adjustment improves resilience, but every modification must still integrate with existing command systems, communications networks, and operational procedures. Operational pressure is exposing the limits of how quickly defense systems can integrate new capabilities. Low-cost drones and distributed autonomous platforms force rapid defensive adjustments, but integrating new defenses requires more than deploying hardware. Command systems must ingest new sensor feeds, software must fuse and prioritize that data, and operators must make decisions inside compressed timelines. Technology often evolves faster than the architecture designed to coordinate it. Adaptation is now constrained less by technology than by how quickly complex architectures can absorb change. Systems that integrate new defenses quickly regain stability. Systems that cannot often find the next vulnerability before the previous one is fully closed. Speed of integration may matter as much as the defense technology itself. #Autonomy #DefenseTech #UncrewedSystems #SystemsEngineering #CUA

The Modern War Institute at West Point has published a study of "The Army and the New Paradigm of Ground Combat: Lessons from Ukraine's Failed Counteroffensive." Several key recommendations for future military operations: 1. Doctrine Adaptation: The U.S. Army must shift from traditional combined arms breach tactics to a more dynamic approach focused on isolating enemy positions, synchronizing suppression of critical nodes, and selectively neutralizing threats. 2. Embrace Multidomain Operations: Incorporate advanced technologies like unmanned aerial systems (UAS), electronic warfare, and precision-guided munitions into offensive strategies. Effective UAS deployment and firepower allocation frameworks are crucial. 3. Enhanced Training and Adaptability: Train units to operate under heavy electronic warfare and contested environments, fostering rapid adaptation to evolving battlefield conditions. 4. Force Preservation: Prioritize the conservation of personnel and equipment through better planning and by avoiding high-risk maneuvers unless strategically essential. 5. Expedited Decision-Making: Develop command structures and processes that enable faster and more flexible responses to changing tactical scenarios. 6. Resource Allocation: Focus investments on technologies and systems that enhance lethality, survivability, and battlefield awareness. https://lnkd.in/eQ_tJb4y