Military Strategy Concepts

A few weeks ago, NATO's Chief Scientist released a report on cognitive warfare that deserves more attention than it's gotten. Not because the language is alarming, it's actually quite measured, but because what it describes has been underway for years and most institutions still aren't treating it seriously. The core argument is this: shaping how populations perceive reality, make decisions, and hold together as societies has become a central element of strategic competition. That's a meaningful departure from what we used to call propaganda. Traditional influence operations tried to change what you believe. Cognitive warfare goes after something more fundamental. It asks how you decide what to believe, and then quietly reshapes that process. The distinction sounds abstract until you look at what it means in practice. When adversaries map behavioral patterns at scale, using data analytics and AI, they don't need overtly false content to be effective. They need calibrated content, information optimized for how you personally process information and assess risk. Your decisions feel reasoned. They feel like yours. But the framework within which you're reasoning has been shaped by someone else. What makes this so difficult to defend against is precisely what makes it attractive as a tool of gray zone competition. There's no invasion, no missile launch, nothing that triggers conventional response mechanisms. The targeting is diffuse. Attribution is elusive. And the legal frameworks we've built around physical harm struggle to define what cognitive harm even means, much less how to respond to it. I've been thinking about this through the lens of what I call Mind Sovereignty: the capacity to recognize when your thinking is being shaped by external systems, and to actively defend your cognitive autonomy. That's not paranoia. It's an awareness that infrastructure is never neutral. It carries embedded values and assumptions, and those get baked into design long before any individual user interacts with them. The NATO report is a signal that this is no longer a fringe concern. It's now recognized at the alliance level as a domain of active operational competition. The question for leaders, in government, in the private sector, in civil society, is whether their organizations are treating cognitive security as a core function or still relegating it to the margins. Most invest heavily in protecting networks and data. Far fewer invest comparably in protecting the decision-making architecture that sits above all of it.

Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) — key takeaways from the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist (STO-OCS) #report ▪︎ What it is: the fight for cognitive superiority, activities (military & non-military) designed to gain, maintain and protect cognitive advantage across the competition, conflict spectrum. ▪︎ Core objective: exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify decision-making, by altering behaviour through any means, increasingly amplified by technology. ▪︎ Why it matters now: adversaries exploit the openness and interconnectedness of democratic societies; fragmenting public trust + disinformation (incl. deepfakes) raise systemic vulnerability. ▪︎ Not “just” InfoOps/PsyOps/Cyber: CogWar is broader, often below the threshold of armed conflict, may not target a single audience, and can aim to create chaos/complexity as an outcome. ▪︎ Where it hits: individual, group and societal levels, eroding trust, increasing polarisation, shaping perceptions and behaviours (illustrated in the report’s “main aspects” model). ▪︎ Decision advantage is the centre of gravity: attacks can exploit the OODA loop (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act), degrading sense-making and the ability to decide/act effectively. ▪︎ Defence posture (STO lens): 3 functions to invest in ○ Degrade adversary capabilities (limit their ability to influence/change behaviour) ○ Improve human & technological cognition (capabilities above baseline) ○ Withstand & recover performance (resilience) ▪︎ House Model = practical research map (7 knowledge areas): situational awareness/sense-making, cognitive effects, modus operandi, tech enablers/force multipliers, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive & behavioural science, social & cultural science, grounded in legal/ethical frameworks. ▪︎ Whole-of-society requirement: because civilians and militaries are both targets, counter-CogWar needs coordinated policy, research, and resilience planning across stakeholders. ▪︎ Scale of NATO work: #CogWar is a strategic S&T challenge; 20 #STO activities initiated (as of Apr 2025), with broad Allied/Partner participation and a dedicated Community of Interest. https://lnkd.in/dwCZMeiR

The phrase “#cognitive #warfare” doesn’t often appear in news stories, but it’s the crucial concept behind #China🇨🇳’s latest efforts to use social media to target its foes. Recent stories have ranged from Meta’s “Biggest Single Takedown” of thousands of false-front accounts on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X, and Substack to an effort to spread disinformation about the Hawaii fires to a campaign that used AI-generated images to amplify divisive U.S. political topics. Researchers and officials expect similar efforts to target the 2024 U.S. election, as well as in any Taiwan conflict. Chinese government and military writings say cognitive operations aim to “capture the mind” of one’s foes, shaping an adversary’s thoughts and perceptions and consequently their decisions and actions. Unlike U.S. defense documents and strategic thinkers, the People’s Liberation Army puts cognitive warfare on par with the other domains of warfare like air, sea, and space, and believes it key to victory—particularly victory without war. #Socialmedia platforms are viewed as the main #battlefield of this fight.

As the year winds down, I snuck in one last nerdy PSYOP read from NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) about how rough 2026 is going to be. The NATO Office of the Chief Scientist (STO-OCS) Research Report on Cognitive Warfare makes something explicit that many of us have been banging on about for a while: cognitive warfare is no not episodic, it’s persistent and already embedded in daily life. A few specific points from the paper for the TLDR types: • Cognition is treated as a contested domain, on par with land, air, sea, cyber, and space. The report is explicit that human decision-making is now a target, shaped through social vulnerabilities and ubiquitous technology. • AI, data, social media, and behavioural sciences are already weaponised, largely below the threshold of armed conflict. The emphasis is less on persuasion and more on degrading trust, polarising societies, and disrupting decision cycles. • Cognitive warfare is framed as continuous, not crisis-driven. The report makes clear this is not a “future risk” but a present condition affecting democratic resilience, military readiness, and alliance cohesion. • NATO’s response is organised around three priorities: 1. degrading adversary cognitive warfare capabilities 2. strengthening societal and institutional resilience 3. improving both human and technological cognition • Since 2022, the NATO Science & Technology Organization has launched 20 research activities involving 26 Allies and Partners specifically focused on understanding and countering cognitive threats. That scale matters. What’s important here is also what the report doesn’t do. It doesn’t frame cognitive warfare as a communications problem, a social media problem, or a tech problem alone. It treats it as a systems and governance challenge that cuts across military, political, and civilian domains. Heading into 2026, technology is only accelerating the permanence of cognitive competition. Influence, manipulation, and trust erosion won’t switch on during conflict and off during peace. They’ll be ambient. Which means the real work ahead isn’t just new tools. It’s reforming NATO processes, national institutions, training models, and decision-making structures to operate in an environment where cognitive pressure is constant. Looking forward to a busy year!

The Pentagon's Strategic Capabilities Office just launched a cognitive warfare initiative, including a project called Basic Information Awareness Operations focused on detecting adversary content and operating in the information domain. This follows the 2026 NDAA, which directed the Pentagon to formally define cognitive warfare and assess which organizations own it. ⚠️ Two things stand out, in my opinion: 1. First, the explicit focus on commercial technology. The Pentagon is signaling that cognitive domain operations require capabilities the private sector is better positioned to build. 2. Second, the language: Traditionally, US military activity in the information environment has lived under information operations, PSYOP/MISO, strategic communications, public affairs — all of which are framed as support functions to kinetic operations. The framing here is different: "nonkinetic military operations" aimed at "disrupting cognition and decision-making." That's treating the cognitive domain as an operational space in its own right, not a support line to something else. This isn't a surprise (the DoW had made clear it was making these changes) but it still does confirm a broader trend towards considering cognitive warfare as its own domain. China's "three warfares" have operated in this space for years. The US is now building its own framework. Worth watching closely. https://lnkd.in/ehsne-Pw

Cognitive distortion represents the leading edge of how AI will fundamentally reshape our future- far more than any transformation of weapons systems or military hardware. We are only just beginning to map this terrain, but it demands immediate attention. The Montreal Institute for Global Security (MIGS) "Wired for War" report reveals a stark reality: while the West debates AI's technological marvels, adversaries like Russia and China are systematically weaponizing these same tools to distort perception, manipulate cognition, and undermine the foundations of democratic society. This isn't science fiction- it's happening now, with Canada directly in the crosshairs. The challenge runs deeper than sophisticated deepfakes or bot networks. We're witnessing the emergence of "authoritarian data pollution" - where AI systems embed state propaganda into the very infrastructure of global information. When Chinese models like Deepseek censor sensitive topics not just for domestic users but for everyone, everywhere, we see how cognitive warfare transcends borders. But here's where opportunity meets crisis: Canada is uniquely positioned to lead in this domain. Our diversity provides natural resilience against homogeneous narratives. Our global connectedness offers unparalleled insight into how information flows across cultures and languages. These strategic multipliers can amplify the millions already invested in making Canada a leader in AI innovation. Yet we must move beyond viewing AI purely through an economic lens. The defense and security nexus requires serious attention. AI will indeed propel Canadian growth, but it can also make Canada - and the world - a safer place. This means developing cognitive security capabilities alongside our technical innovations. It means understanding that the integrity of what Alicia Wanless describes as our information environment - is as critical as the security of our physical borders. The cognitive battlespace is where democracy's future will be decided. Canada has the talent, diversity, and global perspective to help define the rules of engagement. But only if we act now, while the terrain is still being mapped. We're not just observers of this transformation - we can be its architects. #CognitiveWarfare #AI #CanadianSecurity #InfoOps #Democracy

From a place constantly threatened by its larger neighbour (Taiwan) to a country also very dear to me, which has been invaded by its large neighbour already: Ukraine. I had the privilege of meeting Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s Minister of Defence during when Russia invaded, and the insights from our conversation were fascinating and important for people like me, interested in defence, technology, and business, especially regarding the future of warfare and the rapid technological shifts we’re witnessing. 🇺🇦💡 Key Takeaways: 🧠 Cognitive Warfare: One of the most striking points from Reznikov’s talk was about cognitive warfare—how public statements and media influence are now shaping nations' decisions, like Germany’s hesitance to send more aid due to fears of nuclear escalation. This manipulation of information is becoming as critical as physical combat, challenging our ability to analyze and make decisions with clarity. 🤖 Unmanned Warfare: Reznikov highlighted that this could be one of the last human wars, as the future battlefield is likely to be dominated by robots and unmanned systems. AI will play a central role—imagine a €300 FPV drone taking out targets that would normally require much more expensive artillery (10-200x the cost per shot). The cost-benefit analysis is already favoring AI-driven tools and mass-produced tools over traditional military assets. 📈 Tech Evolution: It was frightening to hear how rapidly warfare is evolving. Every 3-9 months, game-changing technologies are reshaping the frontlines, and those who adapt faster will win. Ukraine’s success has underscored the importance of continuous investment in startups and cutting-edge solutions—something Europe and beyond can AND MUST learn from. Warfare as we know it is changing faster than ever before, and staying ahead requires not just resources but the willingness to embrace new strategies and tech.

Modern conflict increasingly turns not on attrition or manoeuvre alone, but on the disruption or denial of decision-making processes. In this context, the UK’s Digital Targeting Web (DTW) will become the UK's strategic centre of gravity. If an adversary can distort the data it ingests, interfere with its logic, or break the trust in its outputs, the systemic impact is severe: paralysis of effects delivery, hesitation in command, and erosion of political will. In this context, the UK’s technological advantage will only translate into operational advantage if it dominates the algorithmic and CEMA deception battlespace. In this fight, trust must be engineered, deception must be deliberate, and resilience must be automated. Success will belong to the side that can protect its own decision cycles while disrupting those of the adversary.

Col Raj Agrawal, this moves the discussion beyond kill-chain acceleration to something more consequential: decision-authority disruption. An adversary may not need to make an AI system consistently wrong. It may only need to make it unreliable at selected moments—creating conflicting recommendations, manipulating provenance, introducing false precision, or causing confidence to collapse during the decisions that matter most. The target is not merely the algorithm. It is the commander’s confidence in the algorithm. That creates a new form of cognitive maneuver: force leaders either to hesitate when speed is essential or to act confidently on information that has been deliberately shaped. Decision advantage therefore cannot be measured only by processing speed. It requires an adversarially tested human authority layer, cross-source verification, visible uncertainty, clear escalation pathways, and the ability to continue operating when AI recommendations are degraded, contradictory, or deceptive. The future contest may be decided by which side can preserve coherent command while the other can no longer determine whether its intelligence is informing judgment—or manipulating it. Dr. Linda Restrepo, N360™ #ArtificialIntelligence #DecisionAdvantage #CommandAndControl #CognitiveWarfare #NationalSecurity