This summer, in 45 days, I shopped in supermarkets in 12 different countries. I said "𝘨𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘵𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘨𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘤𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘳 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘸𝘳𝘰𝘯𝘨". Now this article from MIT Sloan Management Review supports my argument. Grocery retailers are investing in in-store experiences, 3rd party delivery apps, and subscription programs to enhance customer engagement, drive omnichannel growth. While experiential tactics like adding bars boost foot traffic and sales by over 5%, partnerships with third-party apps often reduce impulse purchases and loyalty, and subscriptions risk profitability due to high service costs. The study revealed that customer behavior changes in unexpected ways, making it essential for retailers to align innovations with operational strategy, data insights, and profitability goals. 📍In-Store experiences still drive incrementality, sure. Stores that added cafes or bars saw: +6.82% increase in total spend +5.76% more transactions +15.49% increase in time spent in store My two cents: Food & beverage brands should co-invest in experience zones (like dessert pairings, beverage sampling). This fuels cross-department spend and impulse purchases. 📍Surprise, surprise; impulse purchases decline with delivery apps Partnering with last-mile delivery partners results in -21.2% drop in impulse purchases (esp. snacks, bakery) -6.6% drop in sales volume Relying on 3rd party delivery suppresses #FMCG impulse-driven categories. Brands must rethink digital shelf storytelling and premium placement. 📍No brainer here, of course, subscriptions fuel bigger baskets, but at a cost. For subscribed customers: +55.5% increase in items per order +113.4% increase in order frequency +30% increase in product sales But, approx. 50% of subscribers caused -108.4% profitability loss To resolve this, #CPG brands must help retailers optimize for SKU mix and basket value in subscriptions to avoid profitability erosion. 📍 Consumers shift behavior based on convenience, not loyalty. Shoppers using delivery apps make fewer, smaller trips, buying fewer SKUs, but higher-priced ones. Premium, limited-edition, or DTC-exclusive launches perform better in digital delivery environments. Core SKUs risk de-prioritization. ++ I expect to see more across retailers in 2026 & 2027 ++ 1. AI-based inventory will be mandatory. 2. Delivery platforms will morph into retail and media ecosystems 3. Offline experience zones will serve as sampling hubs (I talked about this at the MIT Platform Strategy Summit in 2022) 👍 4. Shelf-level loyalty programs will emerge, using in-store smart carts or mobile apps, and brands will push on-shelf loyalty triggers like instant coupons. I believe #retail innovation is no longer about features — it's about behavioral precision. Every new tactic must be measured by how it changes the why, what, and where behind each consumer’s purchase. That’s where real ROI begins. Article link 👇
Retail Growth Approaches
Explore top LinkedIn content from expert professionals.
-
-
While global fashion giants 𝗯𝘂𝗿𝗻 𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗼𝗻 𝗰𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗯𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗼𝗿𝘀𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀 and digital campaigns, one Indian brand quietly built a 𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗲𝗺𝗽𝗶𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝘆 𝗱𝗼𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝘅𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗽𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗶𝘁𝗲. Zudio, owned by Tata's Trent Ltd, has rewritten the fast fashion playbook with a radical simplicity strategy. With 545 stores across India and revenues crossing $1 billion in FY25, this value fashion retailer has achieved what many premium brands struggle with - profitable growth without the marketing noise. The secret lies in their contrarian approach. While competitors chase metro cities, Zudio targets Tier 2 and 3 markets like Surat, Kanpur, and Bhubaneswar - cities with growing disposable incomes but underserved by premium retailers. No celebrity campaigns, no e-commerce push, no premium positioning. Instead, Zudio made pricing their brand identity. Their stores average 9,500 square feet compared to competitors' 21,000 square feet, yet generate ₹16,300 revenue per square foot - double the industry average. In fiscal 2024 alone, they opened 203 new stores and entered 46 new cities, proving that operational efficiency trumps marketing flash. Trent's consolidated revenue hit ₹4,656 crore in Q3 FY25, with Zudio driving the majority of this growth through their disciplined expansion strategy. 𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗟𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗼𝗻𝘀: 1. 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁 𝘀𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗺𝗼𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝗻 𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁 𝘀𝗶𝘇𝗲 - Tier 2/3 cities offered higher growth potential than saturated metros 2. 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗲𝘅𝗰𝗲𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗮𝘁𝘀 𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱 - Superior store productivity created sustainable competitive advantage 3. 𝗦𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗹𝗲𝘀 - Clear value proposition resonated better than complex brand narratives 4. 𝗟𝗼𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆 𝗶𝘀 𝗯𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆 - Strategic placement became their primary customer acquisition tool 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁'𝘀 𝘆𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝘁𝗮𝗸𝗲: 𝗜𝘀 𝗭𝘂𝗱𝗶𝗼'𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝘁𝗶-𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗮𝗰𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗹, 𝗼𝗿 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗯𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗼 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗲𝘁𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗴𝗹𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗹 𝗴𝗶𝗮𝗻𝘁𝘀 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮? Share your thoughts in the comments below! #FastFashionIndia #IndianBusiness #BrandingDebate
-
Quick commerce is redistributing share across every channel. For grocery and BPC, the displacement stories are different, and so are the strategic responses. For grocery - GT holds volume dominance, but Q-comm is quietly compounding. In grocery/food, Q-comm draws its growth primarily at the expense of General Trade. The kirana channel isn’t collapsing (already pointed out in yesterday’s post) - but it’s absorbing the first and most direct hit. For grocery brands deeply wired into GT, the risk isn’t immediate revenue loss. It’s ceding Q-comm shelf visibility while competitors establish presence and repeat purchase loyalty. 39% of Indian consumers, including Tier 2+ markets, already expect instant delivery for groceries. That number will only move in one direction. For BPC - quick commerce is no longer a channel. It’s the growth engine. BPC is expected to lead non-food Q-comm at 9–13% share by 2030, as non-food overall expands from 15–25% to 40–45% of Q-comm GMV. Unlike grocery, BPC’s share displacement comes primarily from online platforms, with MT also getting squeezed. Brands already clocking 50–80% YoY Q-comm growth in BPC aren’t outliers - they’re setting the new baseline. 43% of Indian shoppers want instant delivery for BPC, rising to 44% in Metro and Tier 1 markets for grocery. For platforms, this shift also solves a structural margin problem - higher AOV, reduced dependence on low-margin food SKUs. Same disruption. Two different playbooks. Grocery brands need Q-comm presence before dark store shelves get locked in by faster movers. BPC brands need to reframe Q-comm as the primary trial and repurchase engine, not a supplement to MT or e-commerce. Single-channel dependence is no longer a strategy, it’s a vulnerability. Brands that win in the coming times will be those that architect across all channels as one integrated system. Data & image source :: Google × Deloitte - ‘The $250B Commerce Frontier' Report.
-
Last month I was in a Q3 planning conversation with a CPG brand. Their retail media split: Amazon 58%. Walmart 22%. Kroger 12%. Everyone else 8%. When I asked how they decided the allocation, the answer was honest: "That’s roughly what we did last year." New data from Keen Decision Systems tells a different story. Kroger’s profit ROI on retail media: $2.35. Instacart’s: $1.85. Both outperform Amazon, Walmart, and Target on return. The market is catching up. Kroger retail media investment grew 54.2% year over year, the steepest rise of any network. Target was next at 23.4%. Walmart at 23.1%. Kroger Precision Marketing profit grew over 20% in Q1 alone. Here is what is driving the gap. Amazon built the retail media category. $56B+ in annual ad revenue. Massive scale. But scale is not efficiency, and reach is not return. Grocery retailers like Kroger have something Amazon is still building toward: closed-loop purchase data tied to loyalty programs reaching 60M+ households. When a brand runs a Kroger media campaign, they can see which households bought, how often, and whether the spend drove incremental volume or just pulled forward existing demand. That measurement clarity is worth more than reach when every marketing dollar is under a microscope. The tension is real. You cannot ignore Amazon (20.8% CPG share, still growing). But defaulting 60% of your budget to a single platform because "that’s where the volume is" may be the most expensive habit in retail media. The brand teams gaining ground treat retail media like a portfolio: optimize per-platform ROI, not just impressions per dollar. How does your team decide retail media allocation across platforms today? #RetailMedia #CPG #Ecommerce #DigitalCommerce #RetailStrategy #AmazonAds
-
What if your brand gets left behind in retail expansion just because you didn't test your strategy? When a brand expands into a new market, it’s easy to think that what worked elsewhere will work here too. But here's the reality, expansion isn’t just about opening doors, it’s about making sure you’ve opened the right doors. Take Kopi Kenangan, for example. The Southeast Asian coffee brand jthat has ust opened its first store in India in Delhi. And while it may seem like they’re jumping right into the deep end, they’ve actually been playing it smart. Kopi Kenangan, launched in Indonesia in 2017, now has 900 stores in the country. Their global expansion was strategic - they went into what were similar markets from customer profile to pricing. They are now present in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines & now India. Instead of rushing in, they’ve carefully tested their approach across similar Southeast Asian markets first. With a plan to open 50 stores by 2025 in India, they’re not just expanding, they’re adapting and learning with every new market. Then there’s Carrefour, which is re-entering India after a few years of absence. This time, however, they’re approaching it with a calculated strategy: partnering with the Apparel Group to leverage local expertise and slowly expand their presence. Unlike their previous misstep years ago, this time they’re making sure they do it right. And let’s not forget Lotus Bakeries and their partnership with Mondelez to bring Biscoff to India. The brand’s entry is rooted in understanding local distribution channels, ensuring that their entry isn’t just about putting products on shelves, but about doing it with local relevance. What these brands have in common is the ability to understand the unique cultural, economic, and consumer nuances of the markets they are entering, without rushing the process. It’s not just about replicating success from one place to another, but adapting it to fit the new context. This is where many fail, and where these brands excel. Expansion is not just about size. It’s about being smart and strategic. What’s the most effective retail expansion strategy you’ve seen? Or the biggest mistake you’ve seen a brand make while entering a new market? #retail #expansion #marketing #startups
-
Most brands are playing the wrong game. They’re moving the Queen. They should be moving all of the pieces on the board. Let me explain. Marketing-led growth gets all the attention. It’s sexy. It’s visible. Founders obsess over it. But marketing is just one piece. A powerful piece — but still one. Business engineering? It moves all the pieces in symphonic coherence, And wins the game. When I advise better-for-you CPG brands, this is the shift I push for. Most teams pour everything into: – ad creatives – influencer UGC – CRO – new channels Good tactics. But they’ll only take you so far. Here’s what separates the breakout brands: They engineer growth at the business level. They move: – pricing – packaging – cash flow – operations – channel strategy – product architecture They see the full P&L → and use it. Let’s get specific. Example 1️⃣ → Gateway SKU Engineering: A Clean supplements brand. $60/month subscription = Hero SKU. Too much friction. First purchase wasn’t converting. The team launched a $15 trial SKU. Low-risk. Easy buy-in. Result? Trial → subscription conversion jumped 4x. CAC down 35%. LTV up. No ad change required. Business lever. Example 2️⃣ → Cash Conversion Engineering Frozen functional food brand. Growing fast, but cash-strapped. They restructured terms with co-packers. Negotiated faster pay from wholesalers. Cash cycle dropped: 120 → 45 days. Millions unlocked. That cash funded more growth. No new ad creatives needed. Business lever. Example 3️⃣ → Operational Engineering Gut health beverage brand. Local retail only. Wanted national. Cold chain shipping was blocking DTC. Their team reformulated + repackaged → shelf-stable. Suddenly: – DTC viable – National retail opened – Margins improved Game changed. Business lever. ____________ This is why I believe: Business-engineered growth > marketing-led growth. ♛ Marketing moves the Queen. ♗♖♕♔♘♙ Business engineering moves all of the pieces on the board. If you want to build a moat → If you want to scale with durability → You need to think beyond ads and creatives. ☑️ You need to think like a business engineer. Curious → are you moving just the Queen? Or are you moving all of the pieces on the board? ___________________________________________ 🔰 Better-for-you brands = better health, longer lives. 👉 Follow me, Kunle Campbell, and let’s scale impact together.
-
Evolution vs Reset — not every shift in egrocery is strategic Not every change we see in e-grocery today is strategic. Some are structural evolutions. Others are pragmatic resets. And understanding the difference matters — especially for those building platforms, funding infrastructure, or shaping go-to-market. This isn’t theory. It’s a cycle I’ve seen before. Back in 1998, we launched LeShop.ch — likely one of the world’s first online supermarkets. It was pre-broadband. Pre-smartphone. Pre-VC boom. We built it as a scheduled next-day delivery model — long before it became a category. Years later, we exited to Migros-Genossenschafts-Bund. Many assumptions of that time didn’t hold. Others aged well. What has changed most? Consumer expectations and infrastructure density. What’s strategic today? Shifts that align with how people live, eat, and decide — not just how companies operate: • The move from fixed mealtime to real-time consumption: Food is no longer tied to clock cycles. Platforms that serve need-states, not just SKUs, win in relevance. • The rise of ecosystem thinking: Scheduled + on-demand + in-store + dark store. It’s not about more channels. It’s about orchestrating access. • The shift towards fulfilment proximity and flexibility: Not just logistics — but redefined convenience. Consumers benchmark against what feels immediate. What’s a reset? Necessary, but reactive: • The retreat from mega automated fulfilment centres: A course correction. Capital discipline and density economics are now centre stage. • The funding sobriety across platforms: Sensible, but investor-led. A response to capital conditions, not a structural consumer shift. Why it matters: Only one set of shifts rewires the value model. Strategic evolutions don’t just reduce cost — they redefine the consumer relationship. And for those of us who’ve seen the early innings: It’s not just about what changed. It’s about what stayed hard. And how each generation builds with sharper tools — and clearer signals. #egrocery #onlinegrocery #quickcommerce #scheduleddelivery #retailstrategy #retailtransformation #foodtech #retailtech #logistics #supplychain #customerinsights #consumerbehaviour #d2c #omnichannel #digitalretail #freshfood #grocerydelivery #retailinvestment #platformstrategy #firstpartydata #ecosystemthinking #customerjourney #unitconomics #futureofretail #usa #europe #asia #globalretail #fmcg #businessmodel #valuecreation
-
Universal Store opened it's biggest store yet in Bondi Junction where Glue Store used to be... Glue Store closed all 16 remaining stores. General Pants is bleeding cash and discounting up to 60% to hold volume. Meanwhile Universal Store just posted double-digit sales growth AND margin expansion. Same youth fashion market. Same tough consumer backdrop. Wildly different outcomes. Here’s why one strategy is winning where two others are failing: 1. Glue Store had nothing proprietary to defend Glue’s model was pure third-party distribution — stock the same brands anyone can buy direct or from a rival stockist. No exclusivity, no owned-brand margin lever. When the numbers turned ($8.4m EBIT loss in H1 FY26), Accent Group didn’t fight for it — they reallocated capital to banners with a clearer moat. A shopfront for other people’s brands is a commodity business, and commodity businesses get cut first. 2. General Pants is discounting into growth, not out of decline Running site-wide discounts of up to 60% isn’t a growth strategy — it’s a margin-destruction strategy dressed up as one. Their stated FY26 plan is more brands, more categories, more stores in “undercooked” regions. That’s breadth-chasing. It treats the symptom (footfall) without fixing the disease (no reason to shop them over the brand’s own DTC channel). 3. Universal Store built the moat the other two never had Owned banners — Perfect Stranger, THRILLS, Worship — sit alongside curated third-party stock. Perfect Stranger alone grew sales 41.5% with 14.8% like-for-like growth in H1 FY26. That’s not distribution. That’s a proprietary asset compounding inside a portfolio. 4. Growth and margin expansion, together UNI’s H1 FY26 result was driven by sales growth AND gross margin expansion — not one at the expense of the other. Glue and General Pants are both trying to buy growth with margin. Universal Store is doing the harder, rarer thing: growing while getting more profitable. 5. Cash-funded expansion, not desperation expansion $38.4 million in net cash, no debt overhang, a staged store rollout (heavier weighting to the higher-growth Perfect Stranger banner). Compare that to a business propping itself up with cash injections and write-downs just to stay open. The lesson for any multi-brand retailer: assortment breadth is not a strategy — it’s a race to the bottom, because anyone can copy a stock list. Owned brand equity plus disciplined economics is the only lever that’s genuinely hard to replicate.
-
A DTC fashion brand founder reached out to me, frustrated. "We’re spending lakhs on ads, but every new customer is costing us ₹1,200. How do we scale without burning money?" I checked their numbers: 📉 Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC): ₹1,200 📉 Repeat Purchase Rate: 12% (way below industry standards) 📉 Average Order Value (AOV): ₹1,800 (low margin for ad-heavy growth) 📉 ROAS: 2.1X (barely breaking even) They were stuck in the classic DTC trap: 🚨 Scaling cold traffic with direct sales ads 🚨 Over-relying on discounts to convert 🚨 No focus on repeat purchases or brand loyalty We flipped the strategy in 3 steps: 🔹 Built a Content-First Funnel → Instead of selling immediately, we warmed up cold traffic with: • UGC & influencer testimonials (trust-building) • "How to style" content (engagement) • Brand storytelling ads (higher click-through rates) 🔹 Reworked Retargeting → Instead of spamming discounts, we created: • Social proof ads (before & after styling looks) • Exclusive limited-edition drops for engaged audiences • Cart abandonment sequences with urgency-driven copy 🔹 Fixed Retention & LTV → Profits come from repeat customers, so we: • Introduced personalized post-purchase offers • Built a VIP program for early access & loyalty perks • Increased email + WhatsApp engagement (repeat buyers grew 2.3X) 💡 60 days later, here’s what changed: ✅ CAC dropped from ₹1,200 → ₹740 ✅ Repeat purchase rate jumped from 12% → 28% ✅ AOV increased from ₹1,800 → ₹2,300 ✅ Monthly revenue scaled from ₹15L → ₹24L 🚀 Scaling isn’t about cheaper ads. It’s about smarter customer journeys. If you’re struggling with CAC, ask yourself: ⚡ Are you educating cold audiences or just pushing sales? ⚡ Is your retargeting strategy fixing objections or just repeating the same ads? ⚡ Are you retaining customers or constantly chasing new ones? Fix your funnel, and you’ll scale profitably. What’s your biggest challenge in lowering CAC? Drop it below.👇 #DTCGrowth #ScalingStrategies #CACReduction #RetentionMarketing
-
A lot of apparel brands are still treating tariffs, sustainability, and demand softness as separate issues. I think that is a mistake. For mid-market apparel brands, they are all the same problem: margin pressure with less room for error. Tariff risk raises the cost of getting the buy wrong. Sustainability regulation raises the cost of excess and non-compliance. Value-conscious demand raises the cost of misreading what the customer will actually pay for. Which means the real issue is not any one of these. It is how quickly your operating model adapts when conditions change. What I’m seeing right now is a shift from static planning to adaptive systems based on real-time data: 1. Re-rank inventory weekly based on current economics Not last season’s assumptions. Top SKUs are re-evaluated based on: • updated landed cost (tariffs + freight) • current sell-through vs plan • markdown risk If contribution margin drops below threshold, they adjust buy depth immediately, not next season. 2. Move from single forecast → scenario-based planning Instead of one number, they run: • base case • upside case (+15–20% demand) • downside case (-15–20%) And more importantly: 👉 each scenario has a pre-defined action Example: • downside → freeze reorders, accelerate transfers • upside → reorder within 48–72 hours, protect core sizes 3. Treat sourcing as a portfolio, not a decision Not “this is our vendor” But: • core volume → stable vendor • fast reaction → nearshore / quick-turn vendor • margin plays → opportunistic sourcing If lead time variance increases or delay >7 days: → shift future buys, not just react to the current PO 4. Tighten SKU discipline under cost pressure When margin gets squeezed, not every SKU deserves inventory. Fast growing brands: • cut bottom 20–30% of SKUs earlier • double down on SKUs with high full-price sell-through • reduce depth on volatile or low-confidence styles Bring sustainability into operating decisions, not reporting Not just “what do we report?” But: • which SKUs are at risk of overproduction • which suppliers create compliance risk • where excess inventory is building early This is the shift I think defines the next cycle: not better forecasting not better dashboards But faster, more adaptive decision systems tied directly to margin.